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Introduction
In January 2003, the Federal Employment Agency in Germany reformed the allocation of vocational training programmes, which are a corner stone of German active labour market policies (ALMPs). An assignment system based on vouchers replaced the direct assignment of unemployed individuals to vocational training by caseworkers. The aim of the reform was to increase the involvement of training participants in the training decision as well as to increase the competition among training providers. In contrast to the pre-reform rules, under which essentially the caseworker decided about the placement into vocational training, voucher recipients may now choose both the training provider as well as the course (subject to some restrictions concerning the course objective, content, and duration).
Based on rich administrative data, this paper investigates the effect of voucher award on re-employment and other labour market outcomes focussing on the distinct causal mechanisms through which this effect may operate. Specifically, we analyse whether in addition to the voucher's impact through its redemption (i.e. participation in vocational training) there exists a direct effect of mere voucher award (i.e. without participation). The latter may be driven by motivational effects, preference shaping, and awareness building w.r.t. (the availability of) ALMPs, that could affect labour market behaviour in one or the other direction. For instance, the award of a voucher could increase the awareness of and the preference for possibilities to build up human capital and therefore immediately reduce job search intensity. The same effect occurs if the award of the voucher leads to high information costs when looking for an appropriate provider and course. On the other hand, if ALMPs are perceived to be a burden, a threat, or unlikely to be effective, and if voucher award increases the awareness of potential obligations to participate in future (unattractive) ALMPs, then an immediate increase in job search intensity may be expected. It therefore appears to be an interesting and open issue whether the impact of getting a voucher is solely rooted in its actual use or whether 2 a 'direct' effect, whose direction is a priori ambiguous, exists, too. In particular, this allows judging whether it is the quality of the training providers that (through voucher redemption) drive the voucher effect or whether other effects (through preference shaping, awareness building, costs of information gathering, etc.) are important as well.
We use a formal mediation framework (see for instance the seminal paper by Baron and Kenny, 1986) to identify the causal mechanisms of interest and to this end consider redemption of the voucher as a so-called mediator, i.e. an intermediate outcome on the causal path of voucher award to the individual labour market outcomes. Besides the impact of voucher redemption, we are particularly interested in the so-called controlled direct effect (see for instance Pearl, 2001 ), i.e. the employment effect of voucher award in the absence of actual redemption.
1 Causal mechanisms are, however, not easily identified. Even if the vouchers were randomly assigned, this would not imply randomness of the mediator (see Robins and Greenland, 1992) .
To tackle the endogeneity of voucher award and redemption, a particular conditional independence assumption is invoked for identification. It requires (i) that voucher award is independent of potential employment outcomes (under (non-)award and (non-)redemption of the vouchers) conditional on observed covariates and (ii) that voucher redemption is independent of the potential outcomes conditional on the covariates and voucher award. These conditional independence assumptions are related to those invoked in the nonparametric mediation literature for identifying controlled direct effects (see for instance Petersen, Sinisi, and van der Laan, 2006, and VanderWeele, 2009) , in the dynamic treatment effect literature for assessing sequences of treatments (see for instance Robins, 1986 , 1989 , Robins, Hernan, and Brumback, 2000 , Lechner, 2009 , and Lechner and Miquel, 2010 and in the multiple treatment effect framework (see Imbens, 2000, and Lechner, 2001) . For estimation, we use semi- 1 We refer to Pearl (2001) for a discussion about differences between controlled and natural direct effects.
3 parametric radius matching with bias adjustment (Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2011) on the propensity score of (joint) voucher award and redemption given the covariates.
The results suggest that among voucher recipients, voucher award has a negative average (total) employment effect in the first three years after voucher receipt and a small positive one thereafter, with an increased employment probability of roughly 2 to 3 percentage points in each month four years after receiving the voucher. This implies that the initially negative lock-in effect of the voucher award system (likely due to decreased job search) is compensated by higher placement probabilities in later periods. Concerning the causal mechanisms, voucher redemption (and thus, actual participation in or at least starting a vocational training)
has similar negative short term and positive long term effects (again, on the population of voucher recipients) as voucher award, being slightly more pronounced respectively. It is therefore voucher redemption which primarily drives the total effect on voucher recipients.
In contrast, the direct effect on voucher recipients, assessed as difference in mean potential outcomes between voucher award and non-redemption vs. non-award (and non-redemption), is insignificant in most of the fourth year. This suggests that in the long run, mere voucher receipt does not affect employment success (e.g. through a change in preferences).
There nevertheless occurs a negative direct effect over the first three years, suggesting that voucher award decreases job search intensity even despite non-redemption. This points to potential efficiency losses of voucher award systems if individuals decide not to redeem the vouchers, as employment chances are lower than under non-award in the short run and under redemption in the long run. Therefore, voucher award together with non-redemption appears to be the least attractive option, which needs to be taken into account when designing such a voucher award system.
The main contribution of this study is that it assesses various causal mechanisms of a specific voucher based active labour market policy in addition of the total (gross) effect of the 4 programme, which to the best of our knowledge has not been done before. Our research focus is therefore different to Doerr, Fitzenberger, Kruppe, Paul, and Strittmatter (2014) and Heinrich, Mueser, Troske, Jeon, and Kahvecioglu (2010) , who evaluate the effectiveness of various vocational training programmes under voucher systems, but do not consider the direct effect of voucher award. It also differs from and Rinne, Uhlendorff, and Zhao (2013) , who compare the effectiveness of vocational training under a voucher and a direct assignment regime, but do not separate award and redemption effects either. Our paper is one of the few (but growing number of) empirical economic studies aiming at disentangling direct and indirect effects of policy interventions (see Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2009 , Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev, 2013 , and Huber, Lechner, and Mellace, 2014 , for further examples).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional background of the award of vouchers for ALMP in Germany. Section 3 presents the econometric framework, namely the definition of the effects of interest, the identifying assumptions, and a brief description of the propensity score matching estimator. Section 4 introduces the data. In Section 5, we provide descriptive statistics and discuss the plausibility of the identifying assumptions in the light of the data. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 concludes. Three appendices provide further details on the data, on the estimation, and on the results obtained. In January 2003, a voucher-based allocation system for the provision of vocational training was introduced. It aims at promoting the responsibility of training participants as well as market mechanisms among training providers. Potential training participants receive a vocational training voucher, which permits choosing the training provider and course. As explained in , several rules apply. First, the voucher specifies the objective, content, and maximum duration of the course. Second, it can only be redeemed within a one-day commuting zone. Third, the validity of training vouchers varies between one week and three months. Fourth, no sanctions (e.g. cuts in unemployment benefits) are imposed in case of non-redemption.
Institutional background of voucher provision
3 Econometric framework
Potential outcomes and causal effects
Let D denote a binary indicator for voucher award, the so-called treatment variable, and Y the labour market outcome of interest, e.g. employment. Furthermore, let M be a binary indicator for voucher redemption (which implies participation in vocational training). This is the major mediator through which the indirect effect of D on Y operates. To define the effects of interest, we use the potential outcome framework, see for instance Rubin (1974) , and de- Note that the two types of denoting potential outcomes are linked, namely:
Therefore, the ATET may be expressed as:
In our application, The extended notation allows us to define further parameters of interest, namely the average effect of voucher award and redemption vs. no award and no redemption, again among voucher recipients:
The difference to the ATET ( D ) is that here, the redemption is prescribed to correspond to voucher award. Note that only in the special case of perfect compliance, i.e. everyone's redemption decision corresponds to the voucher award (i.e.
, is θ equal to D . Again, part or all of the impact may be due to redemption or to a direct effect of award.
In a next step we disentangle the latter two components and first consider the so-called controlled direct effect, see for instance Pearl (2001) :
This is the impact of training voucher award among voucher recipients net of actual redemption, i.e. under prescribed non-redemption for everyone. Finally, the effect of redemption is identified by
Here, the effect of redemption vs. non-redemption is investigated when a voucher was awarded. Note that γ and δ sum up to θ , which can be seen from adding and subtracting
Y in the expectation of expression (2).
Identifying assumptions
To identify the effects of interest, we impose (sequential) conditional independence of the potential outcomes on the one hand and voucher award and redemption on the other hand (Assumptions 1 and 2 below). This requires that we observe all factors that are jointly related (i) with D and the potential outcome under non-treatment and (ii) with M and the potential outcome under non-treatment. We henceforth denote the vector of observed covariates by X.
Furthermore, a particular common support restriction is also needed (Assumption 3 below)
which implies that suitable comparisons in terms of observed covariates exist across various combinations of D and M.
The latter two parameters and γ are equivalent only in the special case that there are no interaction effects between D and M on the outcome Y. Identification and estimation of natural direct effects has been considered in Pearl (2001) , Robins (2003) , Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009 ), Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010 , among many others.
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Assumption 1:
for all x in the support of X.
Assumption 1 states that the potential outcomes are jointly independent of voucher award conditional on X. This assumption rules out unobserved confounders affecting award and the potential outcomes after controlling for the covariates. Together with the first part of Assumption 3, it is sufficient for identifying the ATET. In contrast, the identification of θ , γ , and δ requires a further conditional independence assumption.
Assumption 2:
and all x in the support of X.
If Assumption 2 holds, redemption is independent of the potential outcomes conditional on the covariates and voucher award. Assumptions 1 and 2 are closely related to conditions (4) and (5) in Petersen, Sinisi, and van der Laan (2006) for the identification of the controlled direct effect. They are also related to conditions (1) and (2) Note that Assumptions 1 and 2 together imply the following conditional independence restriction:
for all x in the support of X. This means that technically, the various combinations of D and M may (despite their sequentiality) be treated as distinct treatments in the identification of θ , γ , and δ based on conditioning on X. We can therefore analyse the effects of the various combinations (
in a standard multiple treatment effect framework (for assessing a treatment that can take more than two value), as outlined in Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) . It
where the second and third lines are implied by Assumption 1 and Assumptions 1 and 2, respectively. 4 However, directly controlling for the possibly high dimensional vector X when estimat-
the curse of dimensionality problem in nonparametric estimation. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that one may instead condition on the treatment propensity scores, in our case
, respectively, which balance the distributions of X. Therefore, it also holds that 0 0,
This has the practical advantage that the vector of covariates is reduced to a single variable and, thus, circumvents the curse of dimensionality, at least if the propensity scores are well approximated by parametric probability models. The effects of interest may then be estimated by propensity score matching on estimates of ( ) p x and ( ) dm p x , respectively.
Estimators
Estimation of the various effects of interest (see Section 3.1) is based on radius matching on the propensity score with bias adjustment. Estimation is semi-parametric in the sense that the propensity scores ( )
x p x and ( ) dm p x are parametrically specified by probit models, while the models for the conditional expectations of the outcomes are unrestricted. Therefore, propensity score matching flexibly allows for effect heterogeneity in X and is more robust in terms of model specification than fully parametric methods.
To be concise, we use the matching algorithm of Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2011), which is more precise than standard nearest-neighbour matching because it incorporates the idea of radius matching (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) . Furthermore, the procedure uses the initial matching weights for a (weighted) regression adjustment for bias reduction in a second step (see Abadie and Imbens, 2011) . Therefore, the estimator satisfies a so-called double robustness property, meaning that it is consistent if either the matching step is based on a correctly specified selection model or the regression model is correctly specified (e.g., Rubin, 1979; Joffe et al., 2004) . Moreover, the regression adjustment should reduce small sample as well as asymptotic biases of matching. Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013) investigate the finite sample properties of this radius matching with bias adjustment algorithm along with many other matching type estimators and find it to be very competitive.
We match on the linear index of the probit specification of the propensity score and use a data-driven approach for the choice of the radius size. That is, we set the latter to 90% of the 0.9 th quantile of the distance between matched treated and control observations occurring in 11 standard nearest-neighbour matching. 5 Other choices of the radius size did not affect the results importantly. Concerning inference, Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that bootstrapbased standard errors may be invalid for matching based on a fixed number of comparison observations. However, our matching algorithm is smoother than the latter approach because it (by the nature of radius matching) uses a variable number of comparisons that furthermore are distance-weighted within the radius and on top applies the regression adjustment. The bootstrap is therefore likely a valid inference procedure in our context. To be precise, inference is based on bootstrapping the respective effect 999 times and using the standard deviation of the bootstrapped effects as an estimate of the standard error in the t-statistic.
Empirical implementation
This section describes the data and the selection of our estimation sample.
Data
Our analysis is based on administrative data provided by the Federal Employment Agency of Germany, namely the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB). 6 The latter contain information on all individuals in Germany who received a voucher between 2003 and 2004, along with subsequent participation in vocational training programmes. That is, the precise award and redemption dates for each voucher as well as the start and end dates of vocational trainings are observed. Furthermore, the data include detailed daily information on employment subject to social security contributions, the receipt of transfer payments during un-5 If there is no comparison observation within the radius, then the nearest neighbour is matched. 6 The IEB is a rich administrative database and the source of the sub-samples of data used in all recent studies that evaluate German ALMP programmes (e.g., Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Paul, 2014 , Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2011 , Rinne, Uhlendorff, and Zhao, 2013 
Sample definition
The evaluation sample is constructed as an inflow sample into unemployment. It con- We account for the different sampling probabilities whenever necessary by using sampling weights. Note that these probabilities differ for unemployed obtaining a voucher versus not obtaining a voucher, while they are identical within each of the two groups.
13 tion needs to take place within 3 months after award, otherwise the voucher expires. One concern regarding the treatment and mediator definitions is the timing with respect to the elapsed unemployment duration prior to award and redemption. Frederiksson and Johansson (2008) argue that in countries such as Germany, nearly all unemployed persons would receive
ALMPs if their unemployment spells were sufficiently long. Individuals who find jobs quickly are less likely to be assigned to and receive training, because the treatment definition is restricted to unemployment periods. Accordingly, ignorance of the elapsed unemployment duration at treatment start could lead to a higher share of individuals with better labour market characteristics among non-treated than among treated. To address this problem, we randomly assign pseudo treatment start dates to each individual in the control group. Thereby, we recover the distribution of the elapsed unemployment duration at voucher award from the treatment group (similar to, e.g., Lechner and Smith, 2007) . For comparability of the treatment definitions of the treated and non-treated groups, we only consider individuals who are unemployed at their (pseudo) voucher award. Following similar arguments, the same approach is applied to the (pseudo) voucher redemption time. 8 This makes to groups of individuals with redeemed and expired vouchers comparable with respect to their duration of unemployment. Table A .1 for a more extensive set of variables): voucher awarded, no voucher awarded, voucher redeemed, voucher expired (note that the last two groups are subsamples of the first group). Pairwise standardized mean differences (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) are also shown as measures of covariate balance. Information on individual characteristics refers to the time of inflow into unemployment. Only for the elapsed unemployment duration and the remaining eligibility for unemployment benefits, we consider the measurement at the time of the (pseudo) voucher award.
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 .1 reveal that voucher recipients (1) and non-recipients (2) differ importantly in several socio-economic characteristics such as age, health, education, and profession. In particular, those awarded a voucher are younger, healthier, better educated, and have higher paying jobs. However, elapsed time in unemployment duration is higher for recipients and accordingly the remaining eligibility for unemployment benefits is lower. Regional differences appear to be limited. The regional differences are also more pronounced.
When comparing the samples of unemployed with redeemed (3) to those with expired vouchers (4), differences in socio-economic variables are often small, with the important exception that the latter group more likely suffers from incapacities (and health problems in general), which may to an important extent drive non-redemption. Furthermore, while the employment histories are quite comparable, non-redeemers have higher elapsed unemployment durations and thus a lower eligibility to unemployment benefits at voucher award than redeemers.
15 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) for a definition of the standardized difference. They consider an absolute standardized difference of more than 20 as being "large". The full set of results is contained in Comparing the development within the different groups, there is an obvious difference depending on the time horizon. In the short-run, the groups participating at least partly in a training programme appear to experience so-called lock-in effects, i.e. they take up fewer jobs than the two other groups. In the longer run, this effect disappear and the groups subject to the programmes experience higher employment rates (and similar unemployment rates) than the two non-participating groups. The econometric analysis below will reveal how much of these 16 differences can be attributed to the effects of the treatment (obtaining a voucher) and the mediator (redeeming it). 5 The selection processes
Variables
Our identification strategy requires observing all variables that jointly affect (i.e. confound) voucher award and the outcome and/or voucher redemption and the outcome in a relevant way. It is therefore essential to understand which factors affect both voucher award and redemption.
Concerning voucher award, the analyses of Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Paul (2014) and Lechner and Wunsch (2013) based on German labour market data suggest that socalled pre-treatment outcomes (e.g. lagged employment and wages measured prior to the intervention or treatment of interest), the prior benefit receipt history, socio-economic factors, and local labour market characteristics are important confounders that need to be controlled for when evaluating ALMPs. This information is available in our data. In particular, the individuals' labour market histories are observed up to four years prior to unemployment and regional factors can also be controlled for at the level of the local employment agency districts.
While Doerr, Fitzenberger, Kruppe, Paul, and Strittmatter (2014) argue voucher award involves a similar selection process as assignment of ALMPs in general, they also point out that it is left to the discretion of the caseworker. An advantage of our data is that it also contains information collected by the caseworker as base for counselling and assignment decisions, namely: information on the job-seeker's current and previous health status (physical and mental), proxy variables indicating whether an unemployed person lacks motivation (e.g.
whether she/he dropped out of a past program or benefits were withdrawn), and former sanc- Given that vouchers have to be redeemed within three months, time-varying (or dynamic) confounding of redemption due to important changes in control variables after voucher award but prior to voucher redemptions should not be an issue. To verify this argument, we estimated the effects of voucher assignment on a range of covariates measured at redemption time, which were all close to and not statistically different from zero. We therefore control for the same set of covariates measured at the same point in time to tackle selection into both voucher award and redemption, namely gender, age, family background, health and incapacities, nationality, school and vocational education, occupation, complete employment and welfare history of the last four years, past programme and sanction experience, timing and region of unemployment, economic indicators at the level of the local employment agency (see Table B .1 in Appendix B for the full set of control variables used). Table 5 .1 shows the results of two propensity score estimations that relate to the selection into treatment and mediator states for selected variables (see Table B .1 in Appendix B for a full set of results). They are based on a probit model. By and large these results confirm the impression obtained by the univariate comparisons of Table 4 .1. Again, it appears that the group receiving a voucher has overall better labour market prospects than the control group, with regional characteristics playing only a very 19 limited role. For the second comparisons, such regional characteristics seem to play a larger role, while individual differences exist, but are far less pronounced than for the first comparison. The clear exemption to this general finding is the state of health which appears to be a key factor related to voucher redemption in the sense that bad health substantially reduces the probability to redeem a voucher.
Empirical results

Results
The propensity score estimates outlined Table 5 .1 serve as inputs into the matching procedures. When performing matching, three potential concerns should be addressed: i) insufficient support in the propensity scores across treatment states; ii) large weights (in the estimation) of observations with extreme propensity scores (which should entail some form of trimming); and iii) the failure of matching to remove differences in the covariates that are relevant in the propensity score estimation. In our application, insufficient support and extreme observations are not an issue problem, as can be seen from the distributions of the propensity scores in the different groups (details in Figures B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix B). Furthermore, all important covariates are well balanced such that no substantial differences remain after matching (for details see Table B .2 in Appendix B). voucher award without redemption (δ ). Concerning employment, we consider only (nonmarginal, non-subsidised) employment of at least one month. The lines reflect the effect magnitudes on the probability to be employed or unemployed in a particular month after voucher 10 Note that the balancing property of propensity score matching is automatic if the propensity score is correctly specified.
Thus, these statistics essentially serve as tool to check the specifications of the two probit models estimated.
assignment over 4 years (48 months). Superimposed symbols on the lines (diamonds) indicate
effects that are (pointwise) statistically significantly different from zero.
The results in Figure 6 .1 suggest that awarding a voucher has a negative (total) employment impact among voucher recipients in the first three years, in particular in the initial months where the employment probability decreases by as much as 10 percentage points. This dip points to the so-called lock-in effect likely due to reduced job search in response to (anticipated) participation in a vocational training. However, after a gradual fade-out of the negative impact over roughly three years, the employment probability is statistically significantly increased by approximately 2 to 3 percentage points in the fourth year. The positive employment effect appears quite stable and may therefore even last in the longer run. This suggests that the voucher award system successfully compensates the initial lock in effect by a higher placement success in later periods. Investigating the causal mechanisms underlying the total employment effect (with essentially symmetric results for registered unemployment), it becomes apparent that it is predominantly redemption (e.g. participation in/start of a vocational training) which drives the results. In fact, the estimated effect of voucher award and redemption vs. no award (θ )
closely follows the overall impact of voucher award, albeit it is somewhat more negative in earlier and more positive in later periods. In contrast, the direct effect of voucher award without redemption ( γ ) is insignificant and close to zero in most of the fourth year. This suggests that in the long run, mere voucher assignment does not affect for instance the preferences for human capital investments in a way that they influence employment success.
We nevertheless find a negative direct effect in the short run: Even without actual redemption, voucher award decreases the employment probability in the first three to 3.5 years and therefore appears to reduce job search activities. This may be rooted in the learning and decision process about the supply of vocational training. Individuals may initially reduce job search intensity in response to voucher award and consider the programmes available. Some of them may then not be satisfied with the programmes available and therefore decide not to redeem the voucher. Rather, they try to find employment again.
We would expect this initial direct lock-in effect to be less severe than for the total effect (which also includes the impact of actual redemption leading to training participation), as individuals should be sooner available for intensive job search when foregoing redemption.
Indeed, we find that in the initial periods, the estimated γ is considerably less negative than the estimates of D and in particular of θ (redemption vs. non-award). Accordingly, the estimate of δ (redemption vs. award without redemption) is initially negative (as δ θ γ = − ) and significantly so. However, with regard to later periods, redemption pays off for the population 22 of all voucher recipients: After roughly two years, the estimates of D and θ dominate those of γ and the estimates of δ are significant and non-negligible (up to 5 percentage points) in later periods.
Besides employment and unemployment, we considered several other outcome variables (presented in Appendix C). One of these additional variables is a measure for employment stability, i.e. being employed for at least 6 months. For the latter variable, the outcome evaluation window only starts in month 7 after voucher award. The estimates of the (total) impact of voucher award vs. non-award ( D ) and voucher award and redemption vs. nonaward (θ ) on stable employment are qualitatively similar to those on employment, albeit the former become significantly positive at a later point in time and are of a somewhat smaller magnitude. In contrast to Figure 6 .1, the estimate of the direct effect ( γ ) now remains statistically significantly negative until the end of the evaluation window (implying that the adverse effect of not redeeming a voucher vs. not getting one is more severe for stable employment), even though it shows an upward tendency.
Furthermore, we investigated the effects on full time employment, defined as an indicator for working on a position with 100% fulltime equivalent. Again, the results are qualitatively similar to the employment effects of Figure 6 .1, including an insignificant direct effect in the fourth year after voucher award. Similar conclusions apply to the effects on monthly earnings: After an initial lock in phase, the estimates of D , θ , and δ are moderately positive (between 30 and 70 EUR) and statistically significantly so in the fourth year, while that of γ approaches zero.
Conclusion
Using rich administrative labour market data from Germany, we evaluated the effectiveness of awarding vouchers for vocational training programmes to unemployed individuals.
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We found an overall negative short term but positive longer run effect on the employment of voucher recipients. As a key contribution, we also investigated alternative causal mechanisms through which the overall effect materializes, using a sequential conditional independence assumption. In particular, we considered the direct employment effect of voucher assignment (net of actual redemption), which may for instance be driven by decreased job search intensity during the assessment of training options, or increased awareness about (and a changed preference for) human capital investments in general.
The direct effect turned out to be insignificant in the longer run, but negative in the short run (albeit less so than the overall impact), pointing to a decreased search intensity shortly after voucher assignment (despite non-redemption). In contrast, the effect of actual voucher redemption (vs. non-award and non-redemption) closely follows the overall effect, albeit it is somewhat more negative in earlier and more positive in later periods. Comparing the latter to the direct effect suggests that conditional on voucher assignment, redemption (and thus, actual programme participation) entails a more severe negative (or lock in) effect on voucher recipients than under non-redemption, which is intuitive because individuals not redeeming are sooner available for the labour market. In the longer run, however, redemption pays off and significantly increases the employment probability by roughly two to three percentage points when compared to non-award in the fourth (and last observed) year after voucher assignment.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that the introduction of a voucher award system, which was embraced for promoting the self-responsibility of training participants and competition among training providers, may come with an efficiency loss in the case that individuals do not make use of the awards: non-redemption entails lower employment chances than redemption in the long run and non-assignment in the short run and therefore appears to 24 be the least attractive option. This needs to be taken into account when designing the provision of active labour market policies through a voucher award system.
Appendix A: Descriptive statistics Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) for a definition of the standardized difference. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) for a definition of the standardized difference. 
